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Ombudsman’s Role 
 
The Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Ombudsman) is an independent and impartial agency 
in the legislative branch of Iowa state government which investigates complaints against most 
Iowa state and local government agencies.  Its powers and duties are defined in Iowa Code 
chapter 2C. 
 
The Ombudsman can investigate to determine whether agency action is unlawful, contrary to 
policy, unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or otherwise objectionable.  The Ombudsman may 
make recommendations to the agency and other appropriate officials to correct a problem or to 
improve government policies, practices, or procedures.  If the Ombudsman determines a public 
official has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary proceedings, the Ombudsman 
may refer the matter to the appropriate authorities. 
 
If the Ombudsman decides to publish a report of the investigative findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations, and the report is critical of the agency, the agency is given opportunity to 
reply to the report, and the unedited reply is attached to the report. 
 
Complaint 
 
We received a complaint in late September 2011 that an Earlham School District employee had 
borrowed a school vehicle for her personal use for one month, with the Superintendent’s 
permission.  The school board had discussed the circumstances of the borrowed district vehicle 
in closed session.  The complainant believed this was contrary to Iowa law and also believed no 
action had been taken against the school employee who borrowed the vehicle or the 
superintendent who allowed the personal use of the vehicle.  He was aware the school district’s 
attorney reviewed the matter and determined the employee and superintendent violated no law or 
district policies.  Since the school board discussed the matter only in closed session, it was 
unknown what, if any, discipline was taken against the employees and whether such actions were 
condoned by the district.  We agreed to investigate to determine if the actions of school officials 
or employees violated Iowa law and if the response from the school board was appropriate. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
We reviewed records that documented the events and the subsequent actions by the school board.  
Those records included a memorandum from Earlham School Superintendent Michael Wright, 
open and closed meeting minutes and audio recordings of the Earlham Community School Board 
(Board), and news articles.  We also interviewed school district officials.   
 
The board’s secretary, Jodi Stroud, found at the end of the work day on June 30, 2011, that her 
vehicle would not start.  She went back to the office and took the keys for the 1997 Chevy 
Cavalier owned by the school district.  Stroud felt borrowing the district’s vehicle was the only 
viable way get home.   
 
Stroud used the vehicle without permission through July 5, 2011, when she informed Wright 
about the situation.  At that point, Wright verbally approved Stroud’s continued personal use of 
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the vehicle.  No written agreement was drafted for the use of the vehicle and no mileage 
reimbursement plan was drawn up at that time or at any point during the use of the vehicle.  
Stroud and Wright did not discuss any restrictions on the use of the vehicle, including whether 
Stroud could use the vehicle for personal transportation not associated with her work. 
 
Stroud used the vehicle over the following weeks, both to and from work as well as during the 
weekends.  Stroud stated to our office that she had intended to reimburse the district for using the 
vehicle and believed since it was summer, no one would need the vehicle during that time.  
Therefore, she did not believe her actions were wrong or would raise controversy.  However, she 
said employees did not borrow district vehicles as a regular practice (she only knew of one other 
case “a long time ago”).  She acknowledged no agreement had been reached with Wright on July 
5 whether and how she would reimburse the district, just that she would pay whatever Wright 
deemed appropriate.  As no restrictions were discussed, her use over the weekends included 
personal errands, although Stroud said she tried to walk as much as possible. 
 
Stroud’s use of the vehicle lasted from June 30 until July 26, when she was in an accident with a 
semi-truck on the interstate.  Jodi did not suffer any serious injuries, but the vehicle was a total 
loss.  Only after the crash did Stroud and Wright discuss reimbursement for the vehicle’s use at 
55.5 cents per mile, based on IRS rates.  Stroud also agreed to reimburse the district for the $500 
deductible and pay for damage to the semi-truck and tow service for the vehicle.  In total, this 
amounted to $1,108.28.  Stroud drove the vehicle for 1,096 miles over a course of 27 days. 
 
The Board held a closed session meeting on August 25, 2011, to discuss the events that led up to 
the accident and review Wright’s involvement in the events.  This closed session was requested 
by Wright in accordance with Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i).  This exception to the open meetings 
requirement may be used to discuss the professional competency of an individual whose 
performance or discharge is being considered by the governmental body.  The Board discussed 
the events at length and each person’s involvement during the 1 hour, 45 minute closed session.  
We cannot reveal the specifics of the discussion as they are protected under Iowa law. 
 
The Board took no action against Stroud, instead leaving any disciplinary action to Wright, who 
is her supervisor.   
 
Following the closed-session meeting, the Board sought the opinion of its legal counsel 
regarding the legality of using a district vehicle for personal reasons and whether the use violated 
district policy.  In a memorandum dated September 1, 2011, which was introduced during a 
school board meeting, Drew Bracken from the Ahlers & Cooney law firm determined Iowa law 
was not violated by Stroud’s use of the vehicle.  (See Appendix A)  Mr. Bracken concluded that 
Stroud used the vehicle for private purposes, but not personal gain and not to the detriment of the 
school district.  Mr. Bracken also did not find a violation of the school district policy (Earlham 
Board Policy Code section 1004.6) since the policy only discourages employees from borrowing 
equipment for personal use, but does not prohibit it. 
 
During our investigation, we were informed about rumors Stroud had used the district’s gas to 
fill up the vehicle during her use.  Our review determined these allegations were unsubstantiated. 
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Relevant Law and Analysis 
 
We determined Stroud’s and Wright’s conduct involving the use of the vehicle to be covered by 
three separate sources of law and policy:  Iowa Constitution Article III, section 31; Iowa Code 
section 721.2; and Board Policy section 1004.6.   
 
 Iowa Constitution 
 
The Iowa Constitution, Article III, section 31 states “no public money or property shall be 
appropriated for local, or private purposes, unless such appropriation, compensation, or claim, 
be allowed by two thirds of the members elected to each branch of the general assembly.” 
(Emphasis added.)  The Iowa Supreme Court has found this provision applies to cities and we 
believe it also applies to school districts.  See Love v. City of Des Moines, 210 Iowa 90, 230 
N.W. 373, 378 (1930) (“[N]o power exists in a city council to appropriate public moneys to 
private use without “public benefit”); see also Attorney General Opinion, 1995 WL 410163 (95-
5-1) (“Although we have never addressed the issue whether the constitutional prohibition also 
encompasses county officers, we have assumed it does . . . Our reasoning rests upon Love v. City 
of Des Moines.”) 
 
The provision prohibits the government from allowing public property to be used by government 
employees for their own use, and generally prohibits any private use of the property.  The Court 
in Love found the fundamental principle under the Iowa Constitution to be “that the power of 
taxation and of expenditure of taxes shall not be exercised for private benefit or for the purpose 
of mere gratuities to private interest.”  Love, 230 N.W.2d at 375.  The property, to be valid, 
“must be utilized by the governing body in the exercise of it governmental functions.”  1994 
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 86 (94-1-6(L)). 
 
The test to determine if the property is used for a prohibited private purpose is whether there is 
an absence of public purpose that is “so clear as to be perceptible by every mind at first blush.”  
Love, 230 N.W.2d at 375.  The school district has already characterized Stroud’s use of the 
vehicle as being for “private purpose.”  (See Appendix A, Bracken’s Memorandum, pg. 2)  The 
Attorney General has also concluded that allowing a typical employee to use a public vehicle to 
commute to work or for social purposes does not appear to serve a public purpose.  1983 Iowa 
Op. Att’y Gen. 47 (83-5-6).  We believe it is clear that no public purpose was served by Stroud’s 
use of the vehicle to commute to and from work and for personal errands during the weekends. 
 
 Iowa Code Section 721.2 
 
Iowa Code section 721.2, Nonfelonious Misconduct in Office, states: 
 
Any public officer or employee, or any person acting under color of such office or 
employment, who knowingly does any of the following, commits a serious 
misdemeanor: 
  . . . 
4 
 
5.  Uses or permits any other person to use the property owned by the state or any 
subdivision or agency of the state for any private purpose and for personal gain, to 
the detriment of the state or any subdivision thereof. 
 
This section raises three central elements that must exist for someone to be guilty of 
nonfelonious misconduct in office:  Use of public property (1) for private purpose, (2) for 
personal gain, and (3) to the detriment of the state or any subdivision.  The Iowa Attorney 
General’s office reviewed these elements in an opinion and concluded: 
 
It seems clear that the phrase ‘to the detriment of the state or any subdivision’ 
should not be construed as words of limitation in the case where the sole use of an 
automobile is for a private purpose and thus for personal gain.  In such a situation, 
there would be by definition no benefit derived by the State (or county) in the use 
of its property, and detriment would be presumed through the natural depreciation 
in value of the property as a consequence of it unauthorized use. 
 
1979 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen 160 (79-5-9). 
 
As previously mentioned, the “private purpose” element is not in dispute.  Based on the logic of 
the Attorney General opinion, the sole use of a vehicle for a private purpose equates to personal 
gain.  In this case, there is no claim or evidence the school district benefitted from Stroud using 
the vehicle.   The Attorney General opinions provide examples where the employee and the 
agency both experience benefits from the employee’s use of a vehicle, including a law 
enforcement officer on 24-hour call taking a squad car home.  This use benefits the agency by 
allowing the officer to respond quickly to an emergency instead of wasting valuable time driving 
to the office to change cars.  However, Stroud’s job duties do not provide circumstances unique 
from any other typical employee that would allow the district to reasonably argue it received any 
benefit from her use of the vehicle.  Therefore, Stroud’s sole use for private purpose satisfies the 
“personal gain” element under Iowa Code section 721.2. 
 
We believe the “personal gain” element was also satisfied by Stroud not having to rent a vehicle 
at her own expense.  Though Stroud asserted she had intended to reimburse the district when she 
first took the vehicle, she could not say what amount she intended to pay.  Further, Wright and 
Stroud stated they had not agreed to any specific mileage reimbursement on July 5, when Wright 
gave his permission to use the vehicle.  Wright could not even recall if the agreed-upon 
reimbursement amount was arrived at before or after the accident on July 26.   
 
As of July 5, the most that Wright and Stroud might have agreed upon was for Stroud to 
reimburse the district some amount for using the vehicle.  We do not believe the “personal gain” 
element can be negated by an after-the-fact agreement on reimbursement.  Further, the Iowa 
Attorney General has warned against reimbursement in circumstances like this:   
 
Applying the rationale advanced in the proceeding paragraphs, use of a public 
owned or leased vehicle for purely private purposes would not be legitimized by 
an agency requirement that employees reimburse the agency.  The character of the 
use remains the same, regardless of the reimbursement . . . Under no 
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circumstances, should this paragraph be interpreted as stating that an employee 
should be allowed unrestricted use of a public vehicle for private purposes on a 
reimbursement basis.  1983 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen 47 (83-5-6). 
 
The Attorney General has also stated a detriment is presumed where there is no benefit to the 
governmental agency and the property depreciates as a result of the private use.  There can be 
little argument even if we were to not consider the obvious depreciation that resulted when 
Stroud totaled the vehicle, the vehicle would have experienced depreciation when she drove it 
for 1,096 miles over a course of 27 days.   
 
Considering all of the circumstances surrounding Stroud’s use of the vehicle, including taking 
the vehicle over the holiday weekend without permission during the first five days, using the 
vehicle as her transportation to and from work, using the vehicle during the weekends that was 
unrelated to her work, and depriving the school district access to the vehicle during her use as 
well as following the accident, we believe Stroud violated Iowa Code section 721.2.  Since Iowa 
law applies not only to those who use public property, but also those who permit another person 
to use the property, we believe Wright violated Iowa law when he gave Stroud permission to 
continue using the vehicle on July 5, 2011. 
 
 Earlham School Board Code Section1004.6 
 
At the time Stroud used the vehicle, Earlham School Board Code section 1004.6, “Loan of 
School Equipment,” stated who could use district equipment and for what purposes.  The first 
paragraph laid out the general limitations, stating that community groups and organizations may 
be allowed to use district equipment “only upon written approval and only for non-profit 
purposes by local, non-profit organizations.”   
 
Later, the policy mentions that personal use of equipment is discouraged:  
 
The Central Office staff may authorize equipment loan usages by local non-profit 
organizations and agencies for local, non-profit activities or purposes.  Personal 
use of equipment by employees or local citizens is discouraged. 
 
While the policy may suggest use of equipment by employees and local citizens, the policy 
mentions twice that use is limited to only local, nonprofit organizations for non-profit activities 
or purposes.  When the policy dictates how permission for equipment use must be documented, it 
requires a written contract be signed by a representative of the local group, but makes no 
mention of individuals or employees.  Read as a whole, we believe the policy restricts use to 
only non-profit groups and does not affirmatively allow for personal use of equipment by school 
employees. 
 
The policy addresses the type of equipment that may be loaned out, stating that usage is strictly 
limited to those items that are reasonably indestructible.  We need to look no further than the 
July 26 accident that totaled the vehicle to conclude vehicles are not “reasonably indestructible.”  
We also believe district vehicles were never intended to be part of the equipment loaned to any 
person or organization.   
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Any interpretation of the school board policy allowing the private use of district equipment 
would make the policy run counter to Iowa Code 721.2.  The Attorney General’s office has 
determined that reliance on a local ordinance or policy will offer no defense to someone whose 
actions are found to violate Iowa law:  “[A]n authorization by an agency or department to use 
public property for other than purely public purposes, if later shown to be erroneous, may subject 
both the department head and the employee to criminal sanctions.”  1979 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 
160 (79-5-9), citing 1977 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen 191, (77-7-10). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude Stroud and Wright violated the Iowa Constitution, 
Iowa law, and district policy when Stroud used a school vehicle for personal purposes from June 
30 to July 26, 2011. 
 
We note the school district has taken steps to revise its policy to clarify who can use school 
equipment since we started our investigation.  Current policy states “[p]ersonal use of equipment 
by employees or local citizens is prohibited.”  Earlham School Board Code section 1004.6(4).  
We believe this clarification should remove any doubt that public equipment cannot be used for 
private purposes by any individuals.  We commend the school district for taking this action. 
 
Given our findings and conclusion, we believe some additional steps are appropriate.  Iowa Code 
section 2C.16 authorizes the Ombudsman to recommend an agency to consider a matter further 
or to take corrective action.  In addition, Iowa Code section 2C.19 states the following: 
 
2C.19 Disciplinary action recommended. 
If the citizens’ aide believes that any public official, employee or other person has 
acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary proceedings, the citizens’ 
aide shall refer the matter to the appropriate authorities.   
 
The Ombudsman makes the following recommendation:  
  
The Earlham Community School Board should consider whether to take any or 
other disciplinary action against both Ms. Stroud and Superintendent Wright in 
view of our findings and conclusion.    
 
The School Board left the duty of disciplining Ms. Stroud to Superintendent 
Wright.  Given Wright was personally involved in the actions at issue, the board 
should assume responsibility for determining what, if any, discipline Stroud 
should receive. 
 
In addition, the Ombudsman will be providing a copy of this report to the Madison County 
Attorney.  It will be up to the county attorney to decide whether criminal charges should be filed 
against Ms. Stroud for her personal use of a school vehicle and against Superintendent Wright 
for permitting her to use the vehicle. 
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Ombudsman’s Comment to School Board’s Reply 
 
 
The Earlham Community School District’s Board of Directors (Board) replied to our April 27, 
2012, letter report of findings, conclusions, and recommendations.  In a May 26, 2012, letter 
from its attorney, Drew Bracken, the Board disputed some findings and conclusions of law in the 
Ombudsman’s report.  This comment will address points made by the Board in its reply.  
 
Disputed Facts Do Not Alter Our Conclusions  
 
The Board’s response to our report takes issue from the outset with our investigation, claiming 
we ignored, downplayed, and assumed facts.  It becomes clear when reading the Board’s version 
of the key facts that they are nearly identical with the facts we presented.  The real issues appear 
to be the Board simply disagreed with our emphasis on certain facts that were not favorable to 
the Board’s position and thought that we did not highlight certain failures and oversights by 
Stroud and Wright, as if those oversights should somehow excuse their actions or inactions.  
 
One such oversight the Board raised related to the “agreement” or arrangement Wright and 
Stroud reached about use of the vehicle.  The Board admitted to our findings that no formal 
agreement was drafted and no specific items or rate for reimbursement were agreed upon when 
Wright gave Stroud permission to continue using a school vehicle for her own personal use.  The 
Board waved off these formalities, contending that Wright and Stroud expected the arrangement 
to be short-lived.  But, how short lived was unknown.  Wright did not tell us the expected 
timeframe or that it was a condition for him giving permission, nor was any more detail provided 
in the Board’s response.  Only after the accident was a specific reimbursement rate set. 
 
The Board also pointed out that we did not gather details about the car and how much money the 
school district made from Stroud’s reimbursement and the insurance payout, as if those payments 
mitigated the actions by Wright and Stroud.  Despite the Board’s best argument that the car’s 
Kelly Blue Book reflects the actual value of the car, the insurance company determined the value 
at $3,100.  The Board offered no explanation why the insurance company would value a vehicle 
and pay more for it than it is actually worth.  We are more inclined to side with the school 
district’s insurance company which had an opportunity to review the specific characteristics of 
the vehicle over a generic Kelly Blue Book estimation when it comes to the value of the vehicle.  
 
As explained in this comment, these disputed facts do not cause us to change our conclusions.  
 
We Stand By Our Analysis and Conclusions 
 
Prohibition in the Iowa Constitution 
 
The Board mischaracterized our statements on the law when it argued that under our analysis, 
“all private use of public property is prohibited.”  In fact, we never stated that all private use is 
prohibited, and we even highlighted an example case where a mixed use may be allowed.  
Further, our reference to the Iowa Constitution quoted a portion of the provision that prohibits 
private use of public property “unless such appropriation, compensation, or claim, be allowed by 
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two thirds of the members elected to each branch of the general assembly.”  We intentionally 
included this language as the legal exception to the general prohibition.   
 
Statutory Exceptions 
 
As noted by the Board, the Iowa Legislature has authorized private use of school property, 
subject to being reimbursed, under Iowa Code sections 297.9 and 285.10(9).  A review of those 
Code sections reveals important differences between the limited use of public property that is 
allowed under Iowa law and the circumstances in our case.  In fact, those Code sections support 
our position under the Iowa Constitution that private use of public property must be approved by 
two-thirds of the members of the general assembly.   
 
The property under Iowa Code section 297.9 is limited to the “schoolhouse and its grounds” and 
makes no mention of the readily portable equipment contemplated by the school district’s policy 
or vehicles as used by Stroud.  In addition to what property may be used, this Code section also 
limits who may use the property.  It identifies specific types of public community groups and 
includes meetings that are of public interest and serve community purposes.  It makes no 
mention of the purely private use of the property by individuals or private businesses.  It is worth 
noting that section 297.9 passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 97 to 0 and passed the 
Senate by a vote of 33 to 0 in 1917, satisfying the Constitution’s two-thirds requirement. 
 
The Board also cited Iowa Code section 285.10(9); however, that section deals only with school 
buses, specifically, and not generally to all district-owned vehicles.  This section also passed 
constitutional muster when it was passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 75 to 24 and 
the Senate by a vote of 42 to 1 in 1973.   
 
Neither Code section addresses the circumstances involving Stroud and Wright and serve only to 
distract from the real issue in controversy. 
 
“Mixed Use” Argument 
 
The Board attempted to attach the “mixed use” argument to this case in hopes of justifying the 
reimbursement Stroud made for her private use of the vehicle.  Specifically, the Board asserted 
that Stroud’s use of the vehicle to travel to and from work satisfied a mix of public and private 
uses, so therefore her own purely personal use of the vehicle was justified when she reimbursed 
the Board.  The Board’s failure to rely on any legal authority or even common sense that use of a 
public vehicle to travel to and from work—absent exceptional circumstances inherent with the 
job—leaves us wholly unconvinced that such use is justified under the law. 
 
The Board cited cases in which courts found a mixed use where a public benefit was derived 
from the private use of equipment, including the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Leonard v. 
Iowa State Bd. of Educ., 471 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1991).  We chose not to refer to the Leonard 
case in our report because the facts were so substantially different than those involved in our 
investigation.  First, the Court in Leonard pointed out that the substance of the superintendent’s 
private enterprise was educational in nature.  Second, the court noted that the school received a 
benefit from the activity, not in the form of a monetary windfall from reimbursement, but as an 
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educational advantage.  Third, the Court pointed out the delicate matter of balancing the 
educational benefits to the public against the incidental private advantage. 
 
Stroud’s private use of the vehicle in this case was not merely incidental.  The purpose of her 
using the vehicle was because her own vehicle had broken down.  At no point in our discussions 
with Wright did he say that his primary focus was on the benefit to the school district.  
Significantly, the Court in the Leonard case pointed out the following: 
 
The local board and the superintendent struck that balance with utmost care.  
They went to great pains to extend an educational advantage to the Board and to 
protect against the expenditure of any public funds on the enterprise. 
 
Id. at 817 (emphasis added). 
 
The use of the school district’s vehicle by Stroud neither served an educational purpose nor 
provided the Board with an educational advantage.  Furthermore, the Board cannot claim that the 
agreement was struck with the “utmost care” or that Wright and Stroud went to “great pains” to 
extend an educational advantage to the Board.  The vehicle usage was not formally authorized, 
and the agreement was not memorialized in writing and contained no specific details as to what 
type of expenses and how much would be reimbursed.  In addition, Wright and Stroud separately 
told us that they were either not aware an equipment policy existed or were not aware of the 
details of the policy at the time of the agreement.  Wright also told us that if he had been aware 
of the policy at the time of the agreement, he would not have loaned the car to Stroud. 
 
The Board also relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s language in McMurray v. City Council of 
West Des Moines, 642 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2002), in which the Court stated that a party 
challenging a governmental body’s actions has the burden to show “there is an absence of all 
public interest in the purposes for which the appropriation is made.” 
 
Like the Leonard case, the facts in McMurray are substantially different than those in our 
investigation.  In McMurray, taxpayers challenged a city’s power under the urban renewal statute 
to finance certain public improvement projects in the area of a proposed shopping mall.  The 
court determined that the urban renewal plan merely provided for the development and 
improvement of public infrastructures and made no reference to the development of a private 
shopping mall.  Specifically, the court determined that public money was being used to construct 
“a municipal fire and EMS station, a municipal substation, various street improvement, water 
mains, sanitary sewers, storm water facilities, and public recreational facilities,” and concluded 
that none of those projects could be characterized as a private purpose.  Id. at 283. 
 
The Board presented no argument for how Stroud’s use of the vehicle serves a public benefit.  It 
states that she used the vehicle “for personal purposes and for commuting to and from work.”  
Commuting to and from work is a standard expectation of any employee, and we fail to see how 
Stroud’s commute serves any unique public purpose to justify her use of a school vehicle. 
 
We did find one limited circumstance under which school employees could use school vehicles 
to travel to and from work.  Iowa Code section 285.11(6) allows teachers to use school buses to 
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travel to and from the teacher’s school “when such school is on an established school bus route 
and such teacher makes arrangements with the district operating such school bus.”  This option 
only applies to teachers and only allows for pick-up and drop-off at points on that route.   This 
statutory exception to the constitutional prohibition against private use of public property passed 
each chamber of the General Assembly by at least two-thirds vote in 1951.  There is no similar 
statute that would authorize Stroud’s use of a school vehicle in the manner that it was used.    
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s “mixed use” argument fails as a defense to our conclusion 
that the arrangement for Stroud’s use of the school district’s vehicle was contrary to law. 
 
Elements of Iowa Code section 721.2 
 
The Board took issue with our statement, based on our interpretation of an Iowa Attorney 
General opinion, that “the sole use of a vehicle for a private purpose equates to personal gain” 
under Iowa Code section 721.2.  The Board quoted only a select portion of our language to 
mischaracterize our interpretation as saying those two elements are redundant.  That is not what 
we said.  We understand that “private purpose” and “personal gain” will be considered separately 
in each case.  We acknowledge there could be a situation where an employee uses property for 
private use but not for personal gain, such as in a mixed use scenario.  However, what the 
opinion said was that, when the use of property is solely for private purposes, (i.e., no “mixed 
use”), the two elements of “private purpose” and “person gain” under section 721.2 are satisfied.   
 
As explained earlier, there is no reasonable argument that Stroud’s use of the vehicle was a 
permissible mixed use that served a public purpose.  We found that Stroud’s use of the vehicle 
was solely for a private purpose and therefore it was for her personal gain. 
 
We also stand by our findings that the personal gain element was satisfied by Stroud not having 
to rent a vehicle, despite the Board’s claim that Stroud had “rented” the school’s vehicle.  As we 
previously stated, the “agreement” reached by Stroud and Wright was tenuous at best.  The 
Board would be hard-pressed to find a private rental company willing to loan out a vehicle with a 
verbal assurance from the customer that she is willing to pay “some amount” to be determined 
whenever she is finished with the vehicle.  The convenience of being able to use the school’s 
vehicle without a written contract or terms of use was clearly to Stroud’s personal advantage.  
 
The Board criticized us for using hindsight to see faults with the arrangement; however, we find 
fault with the arrangement irrespective of what transpired afterwards.  It is the Board that is 
attempting to use hindsight to justify the outcome.  The length of time Stroud would have the 
car, the amount or rate Stroud would pay for its use, the accident resulting in total loss of the car, 
the insurance payment, and payment of the deductible by Stroud—none of these factors were 
known when the arrangement was made.  Wright could not have foreseen Stroud’s accident that 
totaled the vehicle or the amount the school district would recoup as a result.  Had the accident 
not occurred, Stroud could have negotiated a smaller reimbursement or even refused any 
payment, since there was only an informal verbal understanding, the terms of which were 
unclear.  Stroud also benefited from the convenience of not having to enter into a contract with a 
rental car company.  Clearly, Stroud personally gained by the arrangement with Wright.   
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Lastly, the Board argued the school district suffered no detriment, in part, because there is no 
evidence the vehicle would have been used in July.  However, Stroud deprived the school district 
of the vehicle for much longer than the four weeks.  Almost a full year has passed since Stroud 
borrowed the vehicle and district employees are still without a replacement vehicle to use for the 
district’s business.  Regardless of the value of that vehicle, it was still a useable vehicle. 
 
Additional Concern with Vehicle Rental Argument 
 
As an alternative to the failed argument that Stroud’s travel to and from work served a public 
purpose, the Board argued that the money Stroud paid the school district for renting the vehicle 
served a public purpose.  This argument raises a separate legal problem for the school district.  If 
we were to accept the Board’s contention that the school district was renting the vehicle to 
Stroud, we would be compelled to point out that the Board failed to apply to the vehicle a sales 
tax and a separate rental excise tax, as required by Iowa Code section 423C.3.  The total amount 
of the rental, $608.28 ($0.555 x 1096 miles), was never taxed the 6% sales tax ($36.50) and the 
5% excise tax ($30.41).  According to Iowa Department of Revenue officials, these taxes would 
apply even in cases where no contract was signed and payment was arrived at after the accident.   
 
We also want to point out the Dillon Rule, which restricts the exercise of power by Iowa school 
corporations only to (1) those granted in express words, (2) those necessarily implied or incident 
to the powers expressly granted, and (3) those absolutely essential to the objects and purposes of 
the school corporation.  (See Hawkeye Foodservice Distribution, Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 
__ N.W.2d __, No. 08-2056, *10 (Iowa, Feb. 24, 2012); Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163 
(1868)).   None of the Iowa Code sections cited earlier by the Board or our office, specifically 
sections 297.9, 285.10(9), and 285.11(6), expressly grant the school district the authority to loan 
or rent district vehicles for private purposes, nor is such activity impliedly authorized.  Nor do 
we find that such activity to be essential to the purposes or objects of the school district.   
 
We do not find the facts support that Stroud “rented” the vehicle from the school district, and we 
choose to disregard this as a valid legal argument by the Board.  If the Board persists with this 
argument, we reserve the right to refer this matter to the Iowa Department of Revenue. 
 
Appropriate for Ombudsman to Interpret Board Policy 
 
The Board contended it is not within our authority to interpret the school district’s former “Loan 
of School Equipment” policy.  We disagree.  Iowa Code section 279.8, which authorizes school 
boards to make rules governing the school district, does not prevent our office from executing its 
statutory duties over school boards.  Under Iowa Code chapter 2C, the Ombudsman is authorized 
to investigate and make findings and conclusions not only whether an agency’s administrative 
action violates Iowa law, but also if the action is contrary to agency regulation or policy, or is 
unreasonable, unfair, or based on improper motivation or irrelevant consideration.  To perform 
this function, the Ombudsman makes such determinations independent of the agency and does 
not necessarily have to accept the legal or policy interpretations or opinions of the agency. 
 
As for the policy itself, the Board again mischaracterized our analysis.  In response to our 
conclusion that employees should not be included as one of the select parties allowed to use 
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school equipment, the Board stated, “We do not believe it is reasonable to interpret ‘discouraged’ 
as meaning ‘prohibited.’”  We did not state that such use was “prohibited,” but that the policy 
did not affirmatively authorize use by district employees, in contrast with the stated allowable 
use by “community organizations” and “local, non-profit groups.”  We stand by our belief that 
the school district’s former policy, in existence during the time the events at issue occurred, was 
not intended to allow employees to use public property for their own private purposes. 
 
Conclusion and Final Comment 
 
The bulk of the Board’s eight-page reply defended the actions of its employees and touted the 
monetary windfall that resulted after Stroud totaled the school district’s vehicle in an accident.  It 
viewed the course of events in hindsight “from a cash flow point of view” to claim “they worked 
out to the District’s financial advantage.”  However, the reimbursement and revenue obtained by 
the school district does not negate the fact that the arrangement made by Wright at the time to 
allow Stroud to have unrestricted use of the school district’s vehicle was solely for a private use 
or purpose.  We stand by our conclusion that the arrangement was contrary to Iowa law.   
 
The Board does not believe a referral to the county attorney is appropriate.  Because use of 
public property for private purpose is a serious matter and because we found a violation of law, 
we will provide a copy of our report, together with the Board’s reply and this comment, to the 
county attorney.  It will be up to the county attorney to decide if criminal charges should be filed. 
 
The Board did not dispute our recommendations and said it will convene to reconsider if 
appropriate disciplinary action has been rendered and if any additional disciplinary action is 
warranted against Wright and Stroud.  We hope the Board’s considerations will not minimize 
their actions based on any monetary benefit it reaped in the end, but will be based on the law.     
 
